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Preface 
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Abstract 
This paper describes the regulatory agencies in Norway as part of the population of 
Norwegian state agencies by focusing on who controls and on what is controlled and 
how. We analyze whether regulatory agencies are regulated and controlled to different 
degrees, by different external actors, and in different ways than other agencies and on 
whether this control focuses on different aspects. We also examine whether the 
variation in perceived regulation and control according to type of agency task is 
sustained if we control for structural and cultural features. The empirical basis is a broad 
survey of Norwegian state agencies carried out in 2004 and the theoretical approach 
embraces task-specific, structural-instrumental, and cultural-institutional perspectives. 
We find that regulatory tasks represent a major activity for government agencies in 
Norway and that external control by both the executive and by the legislative bodies of 
agencies is rather significant. Moreover, in contrast to what we would expect, given 
current regulatory orthodoxy, regulatory agencies are controlled to a larger extent than 
other agencies. 
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet beskriver og analyserer regulerings- og tilsynsorganer i Norge som del av 
populasjonen av norske forvaltningsorganer. Det fokuseres spesielt på hvem som 
kontrollerer, hva som er kontrollert og hvordan det kontrolleres. Vi analyserer om 
regulerings- og tilsynsorganer blir styrt og kontrollert i ulik grad, av ulike eksterne 
instanser og på ulik måte enn andre forvaltningsorganer og om denne kontrollen 
fokuserer på forskjellige aspekter. Vi analyserer også om variasjonen i opplevd 
regulering og kontroll mellom forvaltningsorganer med ulike oppgaver også er til stede 
når det kontrolleres for strukturelle og kulturelle kjennetegn. Det empiriske grunnlaget 
er en bred survey av norske statlige forvaltningsorganer som ble gjennomført i 2004 og 
det teoretiske utgangspunktet er et oppgavespesifikt perspektiv, et instrumentelt og et 
kulturelt perspektiv. Vi finner at reguleringsoppgaver representerer en hovedaktivitet for 
statlige forvaltningsorganer i Norge og at ekstern kontroll både fra departementshold og 
fra Stortingets organer er temmelig omfattende. I motsetning til hva vi ville vente ut fra 
gjeldende reguleringsortodoksi finner vi at reguleringsorganer er sterkere kontrollert enn 
andre forvaltningsorganer. 
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Introduction 
Regulation and control have a long and lasting history in contemporary welfare states, 
and over time a number of regulatory agencies, broadly ranging in their legal basis, 
organization and practical execution, have developed. In recent years a broad and 
comprehensive program of regulatory reform has been launched internationally (cf. 
OECD 2002) which has also affected Norway. As part of this development, the 
Norwegian government recently formulated a new regulatory policy designed to 
strengthen supervisory agencies and make them more autonomous, to relocate some 
agencies and to clarify the regulatory role. In parallel with these comprehensive internal 
reform efforts, external auditing and control are increasing, owing to the revitalization 
of legislative control and increased Europeanization and internalization. 
There is an inherent tension in regulatory reform, stemming from its dual 
prescription of both enhanced autonomy and more control. This is an enduring tension 
in the history of regulatory governance. On the one hand, supervisory agencies are 
supposed to gain more autonomy, both from political executives and market actors. On 
the other hand, central political control is expected to be enhanced by a strengthening 
of frame steering and regulatory power (Christensen and Lægreid 2004a).  
Generally, there is a strong belief among reform agents that formal structure will 
make a difference, and reorganization is thus a main strategy in regulatory reform. There 
is a large literature on how formal structure affects behaviour (Egeberg 2003), yet the 
implications of formal structure are often not well understood (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004). In this paper we will challenge the one-sided focus on formal agency structure 
and also look at task-specific features and cultural characteristics in order to understand 
how regulation and control are perceived in different types of civil service organizations.  
The main research question concerns the regulation of regulatory organizations. 
Research on regulatory agencies to date has concentrated on regulatory and 
organizational efficiency and has not paid much attention to the issues of accountability 
and democratic oversight (Flinders 2004, Majone 2001, 2002, Shapiro 1997, Thatcher 
2002). The current regulatory orthodoxy prescribes a high degree of autonomy for 
regulatory agencies, but the issue of how to make agencies independent and at the same 
time accountable is also a major concern. The challenge is to find ways of making 
agency autonomy and democratic accountability complementary and mutually 
reinforcing rather than competing values (Christensen and Lægreid 2005a).  
 The empirical basis is a broad survey of Norwegian state agencies carried out in 
2004. Here, regulatory agencies are distinguished from other agencies according to their 
own perception of what kind of tasks they perform. The paper sets out to do three 
things: 1) to describe the regulatory agencies in Norway as part of the population of 
Norwegian state agencies; 2) to describe and analyze whether regulatory agencies are 
regulated and controlled to different degrees, by other external actors, using different 
parameters and in different ways than agencies having other tasks; 3) to analyze whether 
the variation in perceived regulation and control according to type of agency task is 
sustained when structural and cultural features of the agencies are taken into account.  
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The main set of dependent variables is different dimensions of perceived regulation 
and control. We will distinguish between who controls, what is controlled, and how 
control is carried out. With regard to who controls, the importance of different types of 
external (national and international) bodies is discussed, as well as who makes the 
regulations. What is controlled refers to what aspects of the organization’s activities are 
subject to control. How control is carried out refers to instruments of control, such as 
performance audit and inspections. 
In this paper we will first discuss some central concepts like agency, regulation and 
regulatory agencies. Second, we will present the Norwegian context of agencification 
and regulatory reform. Third, we will outline three theoretical perspectives, focusing on 
different explanatory variables, and formulate hypotheses on the importance of agency 
task and other independent variables for perceived regulation and control. Fourth, we 
will briefly describe the database, the methodology and the Norwegian regulatory 
agencies as part of the population of state agencies. Fifth, we will discuss whether 
regulatory agencies are different from other agencies with regard to who controls, what 
is controlled, and how control is carried out. Sixth, we will draw other explanatory 
variables into the discussion on perceived regulation and control. Finally, we will relate 
our findings to other studies and draw conclusions.  
Central concepts: Agencies, regulation 
and regulatory agencies 
State agencies are part of the civil service, but they are structurally devolved from the 
ministries. They carry out public tasks on a permanent basis, are staffed by civil servants, 
are subject to public law procedures, and are normally financed mainly by the state 
budget. They have some autonomy from the ministries in policy decision-making and in 
personnel, financial, and management matters, but they are not totally independent 
(Pollitt et al. 2004). 
Contemporary agency reforms tend to involve role purification, whereby policy 
formulation, service delivery, purchasing, and regulation are split up and allocated to 
specific agencies according to the principle of «single-purpose organizations», thus 
increasing horizontal specialization both within and between public organizations 
(Boston et al. 1996). In contrast to the former integrated model in which regulation was 
one of many tasks and a by-product of other relationships, the new model creates 
specialized agencies responsible for regulation and inspection with explicitly allocated 
resources. Whether these agencies carry out their specialized functions in only one 
sector or across sectors varies, however (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). 
The agency model is different from the traditional integrated bureaucratic model in 
that it combines expertise, autonomy, and specialization of tasks in a narrow range of 
policy issues (Majone 1997). There is separation both on a vertical dimension between 
agencies and ministries and on a horizontal dimension between different agencies 
responsible for different tasks. This creates a lot of organizational complexity, 
potentially requiring more coordination (Gregory 2003). 
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Regulation is an ambiguous concept that can be used in both a broad and a narrow 
sense (Baldwin, Scott and Hood 1998, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004, cf. Christensen and 
Lægreid 2005a). Most broadly, regulation can be seen as social control of all kinds, 
including non-intentional and non-state mechanisms. Regulation can also be defined as 
all types of state intervention in the economy or the private sphere designed to steer 
them and to realize public goals. In the narrowest sense regulation means formulating 
authoritative sets of rules and setting up autonomous public agencies or other 
mechanisms for monitoring, scrutinizing, and promoting compliance with these rules. 
According to Selznick (1985) regulation is sustained and focused control by a public 
agency over activities that are valued by a community. The establishment of 
autonomous regulatory agencies brought about by the regulatory reform movement is 
connected to this narrow meaning of regulation. 
In this paper we are concerned primarily with the narrower definition of regulation – 
i.e. regulation as a) goal formulation, rule-making and standard-setting; b) monitoring, 
information-gathering, scrutiny, inspection, audit, and evaluation: and c) enforcement, 
behaviour-modification, and the application of rewards and sanctions (Hood, Rothstein 
and Baldwin 2001). These tasks may be carried out by a single organization or else 
delegated separately to specialized agencies. While regulation is normally considered to 
be regulation by the state, there is also a growing focus on regulation inside government 
performed by a variety of public agencies that set standards and use different forms of 
performance management and compliance measures to audit civil service organizations 
(Hood et al. 1999, James 2000, Power 1997). Regulation inside government addresses 
the ways in which government officials oversee the work of other bureaucrats using 
rules on how public bodies should operate formulated within the government. The 
question is how to regulate the regulators. For the agencies themselves deregulation may 
imply more freedom from the central ministries in such areas as personnel, finance, and 
management. But while the agencies may have more autonomy from the ministries, they 
also face an expansion in oversight from ex ante authorization to ex post control, 
management-by-objectives-and-results techniques, and performance audit (Hood et al. 
1999, Christensen and Lægreid 1998).  
Regulation can be carried out by a variety of bodies, such as parliaments, ministries, 
courts, local authorities, private-sector organizations, and international organizations. In 
this paper we will focus on central regulatory agencies. Not all agencies are regulatory 
agencies: some are primarily responsible for managerial tasks, while others provide 
services or offer policy advice. In fact, mixed or multi-functional roles were for a long 
time normal for many agencies in many countries (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b).  
Regulatory agencies are a sub-group of state agencies, and one of their main tasks is 
to control the power of the market, ensure fair competition, and protect consumers and 
citizens by guiding and implementing policy regulation. One of their features is that they 
often seem to be constitutional hybrids having both statutory power and incorporated 
status. These bodies carry out regulation using their own delegated regulatory power, 
resources, and responsibilities. They are neither directly elected by the people nor 
directly managed by elected officials (Gilardi 2004, Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). 
Generally, regulatory agencies have more autonomy than agencies with managerial tasks. 
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The Context1 
Norway is a small, unitary, parliamentary, and multiparty state. Since the early 1970s, it 
has mainly been ruled by minority governments, and since 1994 it has been connected 
to the EU through the Economic Area Agreement. In a comparative perspective, it has 
a strong democratic tradition, scores high on per capita income and abundance of 
natural resources, has relatively strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is consensus-
oriented and has well-developed corporatist arrangements. It also has one of the most 
comprehensive and universal welfare states in the world with a large public sector. Its 
economy is open and dependent on export. The relationships between parliament, 
ministers, and agencies are based on the principle of ministerial responsibility, meaning 
that the minister is responsible to the parliament for all activities within his or her policy 
areas in the ministry as well as in subordinate bodies. Political control over the civil 
service has, however, been general and passive, allowing the executive a lot of leeway. 
This seems to reflect some major features of the political-administrative system: high 
levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes and norms among political and administrative 
leaders and within the public sector (Christensen and Lægreid 2005b). There is also a 
high degree of transparency and an open attitude to critical scrutiny by the media. 
Agencies have been a major organizational form in the Norwegian central 
government for a long time, representing an enduring historical conflict between the 
political executive and professional groups. The agency tradition goes back to the 1850s 
when the first autonomous professional agencies (called directorates) outside the 
integrated and jurist-dominated hierarchical ministries were established, primarily in the 
communications sector (Christensen and Roness 1999). In the mid-1950s the 
government stated a new principle for agency structure and increased the number of 
independent agencies. The idea was that the more technical issues and routine tasks 
should be moved to the agencies, while policy and planning tasks should stay within the 
ministries. The new doctrine resulted in the establishment of several new agencies over 
the next 15 years, but this development slowed down in the 1970s (Christensen and 
Roness 1999, Grønlie 2001). 
The dominant agency model in Norway has historically been rather unified, with little 
horizontal specialization (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). In most agencies 
administrative tasks, regulatory and control tasks, and service provision and production 
tasks have been combined and integrated. Traditionally, Norway has not had any type of 
administrative court. Appeals are directed to the parent ministry, which can also instruct 
the agencies. The idea that there ought to be separate agencies for different tasks is 
rather new, although some of the agencies have enjoyed enhanced authority for some 
time, mainly in financial and personnel matters, but also in some substantive areas 
(Lægreid et al. 2003). 
Over the past 15 years, a process of structural devolution has been going on in the 
Norwegian central government, and the independent agency model has become more 
differentiated (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). This development was partly inspired by 
                                                 
1 This section draws on Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen (2005) and Christensen and Lægreid (2004b). 
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New Public Management ideas and solutions but was also a part of Norway’s adaptation 
to the EU and the internal market. The model combines vertical inter-organizational 
specialization, whereby agencies formally gain more authority, with increased horizontal 
inter-organizational specialization, whereby the distribution of roles and tasks among 
agencies is more differentiated and non-overlapping. 
Until the late 1980s, major public sectors like railways, telecommunications, electrical 
power, postal services, forestry, grain sales, airports, road construction, and public 
broadcasting were organized as integrated government services. Since then, the 
commercial parts of these enterprises have become corporatized, while the regulatory 
parts have been streamlined into separate agencies, creating a more fragmented and 
disintegrated model. Over time, the primary task of an increasing proportion of agencies 
has become regulation and control (Rubecksen 2004). Some of these agencies, like the 
Data Inspectorate, the Lottery Inspectorate, and the Media Authority, are new, but 
many also represent re-labelling and rearrangements of former activities and 
organizations.  
Since the mid-1990s NPM has gained a stronger footing in Norway, and reforms 
have become increasingly comprehensive and radical in recent years (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001, 2002). The introduction of Management by Objectives and Results, 
private sector management tools, changes in forms of affiliation from horizontally 
integrated models to single-purpose models, increased agencification, and the 
establishment of autonomous regulatory bodies have been the result. There has also 
been a trend in some policy areas to merge smaller bodies into larger units (Lægreid et 
al. 2003). 
In 2003 the current conservative-centre minority government put forward a White 
Paper to the parliament (St.meld. nr. 17 (2002–2003)), proposing a new regulatory 
policy, whereby regulatory agencies would increase their independence from the 
ministries. Political considerations were to be confined primarily to setting general 
norms through laws and rules, while executive politicians were expected to leave 
individual cases to be handled by competent professionals in the regulatory agencies. 
The regulatory agencies were to be endowed with legitimacy by removing the ambiguity 
inherent in mixing political and professional considerations, by making the balance 
between these considerations more explicit, and by strengthening their professional 
competence. The opportunities for ministers to instruct the agencies in the handling of 
individual cases were to be reduced by directing ministerial responsibility more towards 
broader policy questions and general guidelines. In addition, it was proposed to change 
the complaints procedure in several agencies by moving it away from the ministries and 
into new independent bodies of appeal. The parliament did not approve all of these 
proposals, and a compromise was reached with some of the opposition parties in which 
the establishment of independent appeal boards was postponed until after the next 
general election (to be held in September 2005). It was also agreed that the restriction in 
the power of executive political leaders to instruct the agencies should not be 
introduced as a general principle but should be handled on a case-by-case basis 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). 
In 1997 OECD started a comprehensive study of regulatory policy (OECD 1997). In 
its assessment of Norway, OECD acknowledged that the Nordic incremental, 
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consensus-oriented model of governance, emphasizing egalitarian values, a high level of 
mutual trust, solidarity, high standards of social welfare, an active intervening state, 
broad participation from affected interests and a large public sector, had been successful 
(OECD 2003). In spite of this success and the fact that Norway still performs very well 
today, the OECD report suggested that Norway should abandon this governance model 
and «prepare for the future now». It was more or less taken for granted that the 
integrated, reactive, ad hoc and piecemeal approach, which balances different values and 
goals, should be replaced by comprehensive, proactive and systematic regulatory 
reforms. Without any deep analysis, it was suggested that the well-functioning 
Norwegian model should be replaced by the new OECD orthodoxy. The new recipe is 
to separate the regulatory role of the state from its roles as owner, policy-maker and 
commercial actor, to upgrade competition policy to make it the main goal, to deregulate 
and liberalize state monopolies, to reduce state ownership, commercialize public 
services, and improve the performance, efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. 
The regulatory agencies in Norway seem to have developed without experiencing any 
major crisis; they cope well with technical tasks and have demonstrated good regulatory 
practice and a capacity for adaptation. In spite of this positive assessment, OECD 
criticized the regulatory reforms for being partial and piecemeal, and the policy 
recommendation was to strengthen the independence and authority of the regulatory 
agencies by reducing the opportunities for appealing decisions to the minister and the 
ministry’s scope for instructing the agencies. Thus, many of the major recommendations 
coincide with the new regulatory policy introduced by the conservative-centre 
government in its White Paper. Both the OECD’s regulatory program and the 
European Economic Area Agreement, which gives Norway access to the EU internal 
market, affected the content of this document.  
Summing up, along the vertical dimension the independent agency model is an old 
and contested organizational form in Norwegian central government. One of the most 
enduring conflicts in Norwegian administrative policy has revolved around issues of 
agency autonomy and ministerial control. Along the horizontal dimension the traditional 
integrated model has been challenged recently, by national as well as international 
reform programs.  
Theoretical approaches: task, structure 
and culture 
We will distinguish between three perspectives on organizations: a task-specific 
perspective, emphasizing the importance of the activities or tasks that the different state 
agencies handle; a structural-instrumental approach, focusing on the importance of 
formal organizational structure; and a cultural-institutional approach, attributing 
variations in how regulation and control are perceived and practised to informal 
organizational features. Our main perspective will be the task-specific perspective and 
the importance of regulatory activities, while the variables derived from the other 
perspectives will be used as control variables. 
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A task-speci f ic  perspect ive  
A task-specific perspective assumes that the requirements and constraints inherent in 
the primary tasks of the different agencies influence the regulation and control of those 
agencies (Pollitt et al. 2004). The main idea is that tasks matter and that we cannot 
discuss specific organizational structures and processes without taking into account the 
particular activities to which they apply. Task specificity and the nature of the actual 
work are important to understand the variation in actual autonomy and control of state 
agencies. The division of tasks may play an important role in the behaviour of state 
agencies and in how they are managed and controlled. Two well-known parameters for 
defining agency tasks are to what degree their output and outcome can be observed 
(Wilson 1989). Other important considerations are to what degree the tasks are 
politically sensitive, whether they involve major financial resources, and whether they 
are subject to market competition (Pollitt et al. 2004). 
In this paper we are particularly interested in the importance of regulatory tasks. 
How and to what extent do agencies engaged in regulatory tasks differ from agencies 
engaged in other types of tasks as regards perceived regulation and control? Studies of 
state agencies reveal that there are significant variations in behaviour according to the 
agencies’ tasks (Pollitt et al. 2004). According to the regulatory policy doctrines of today, 
regulatory agencies should be at arm’s length from ministries in order to enhance 
credibility and reduce political uncertainty. Thus, our main hypothesis (H1) is that agencies 
engaged in regulatory tasks will generally perceive themselves as subject to less 
regulation and control than agencies engaged in other types of tasks. 
A structura l - instrumental  perspect ive  
A main feature of many organizational approaches is the concept of bounded rationality 
(March and Simon 1958), which implies that decision-makers face problems of capacity 
and understanding and have to make some selections. The formal organizational 
structure represents one important selection mechanism. Formal structure and 
procedures organize some actors, cleavages, problems, and solutions into decision-
making processes in the public sector, while others are excluded. 
Gulick (1937) argues that there is a rather close connection between the formal 
structure chosen and the practice within and between organizations, underlining that the 
way formal authority is distributed among hierarchical levels is important for autonomy 
and control in practice. In a system characterized by independent agencies this 
distribution is biased against the political executive and we will thus expect to find a 
rather low level of regulation and control of the agencies. The formal instruments of 
steering are diluted, the distance between administrative levels increases, and political 
signals are generally weaker in independent bodies (Egeberg 2003). Whether agencies 
are specialized according to process, purpose, clientele, or geography will also affect 
their behaviour. It makes a difference whether central government is an integrated 
system under ministerial responsibility or a disintegrated system of autonomous or semi-
autonomous organizations, whether it is centralized or decentralized, and whether it is 
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specialized according to the principle of geography and/or other principles (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2005a). Thus formal structure matters. 
Based on this general perspective we will adopt three structural variables: policy area, 
type of agency, and form of affiliation. Most regulatory tasks, as well as other types of 
tasks, are related to specific policy areas. Here we take as our point of departure a 
categorization according to parent ministry, whereby we distinguish between economic, 
welfare, and other types of ministries (cf. Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2003). Based 
on the regulatory reforms, our hypothesis (H2) is that regulation and control of agencies 
generally will be perceived as weaker in the economic area than in the welfare state area 
and other areas because norms of steering at arm’s length are stronger in the «harder» 
than in the «softer» policy areas. 
The term type of agency refers to the internal organization of the agencies. Based on 
Gulick’s principles of specialization, we will expect the existence of a geographical 
component in agency specialization in addition to specialization according to ministerial 
sectors will tend to decrease the regulation of subordinate bodies. Agencies organized 
according to geography will be more embedded in regional or local networks, which will 
tend to reduce the extent of regulation and control by their parent ministry and other 
superior bodies. In Norway, most ministries are organized according to purpose, a few 
have elements of process or clientele, while none are specialized according to geography 
at the ministerial level. Thus, our hypothesis (H3) will be that agencies organized 
according to geography in combination with another principle will perceive themselves 
as subject to less regulation and control than agencies without a territorial component. 
Form of affiliation represents the external organization, or form and degree of 
structural devolution from the parent ministry. We will primarily distinguish between 
ordinary agencies and agencies with various forms and degrees of formal authority. The 
hypothesis (H4) will be that the most structurally devolved organizations will perceive 
themselves as subject to less regulation and control than agencies that are structurally 
closer to the ministry. 
A cul tura l - inst i tut ional  perspect ive  
A third set of factors concerns the historical and cultural traditions of political-
administrative systems (Selznick 1957). In institutional approaches informal norms, 
identities, and the logic of appropriateness are important (March and Olsen 1989). The 
point of departure is that a certain style of regulating and controlling agencies has 
developed over time. Norms and values within agencies and central government and 
internal dynamics are important. Path dependencies constrain what is appropriate and 
possible to move to agency status and how the agencies will operate. The reform road 
taken reflects the main features of national institutional processes, where institutional 
«roots» determine the path forward (Krasner 1988). Change is characterized by historical 
inefficiency and incrementalism. What happens in one agency is not a blueprint for 
developments in other agencies. Regulatory reforms reinforce underlying distinctive 
agency-specific or sector-specific trajectories and historical legacies, and the effects of 
formal structure are mediated and constrained by contextual factors (Thatcher and 
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Stone Sweet 2002). Administrative traditions represent «filters» producing different 
outcomes in different agencies. 
Certain styles of regulating and controlling agencies have developed over the years, 
whereby agencies are seen as strong and integrated instruments of political development 
serving particular political goals. For a long time this was a dominant feature of the 
Norwegian administrative model (Grønlie 1999). Over the past years, however, this 
model has been challenged, and the culture has changed towards giving agencies more 
leeway and autonomy and allowing for looser coupling to political goals, and it has 
gradually come to be taken for granted that agencies should be at arm’s length from the 
political executive. The extent of this cultural change will probably vary between 
agencies. In some administrative cultures well-established informal contacts and 
networks between ministries and agencies may undermine their autonomy and create 
stronger integration between ministry and agency than expected from the formal model 
(Jacobsson 1984, Pierre 2004). 
We will distinguish between three indicators of administrative culture. First, agency age. 
Normally, the development of a distinct culture and tradition takes some time. Older 
organizations will tend to have developed a stronger identity than younger ones, and the 
potential for socialization of their members into a common culture is higher. Thus, we 
will expect (H5) older agencies to perceive themselves as being subject to less regulation 
and control than younger agencies. 
Second, agency size. Small agencies may generally have a more homogeneous culture 
and a more distinct identity than large agencies, and they are thus more able to modify 
signals coming from the ministry. At the same time, they may have less capability to 
exploit and utilize the possibilities offered by structural devolution and formal authority. 
Thus, assuming the primacy of homogeneous identity one may expect (H6a) small 
agencies generally to perceive themselves as being subject to less regulation and control 
than large agencies. If, on the other hand, we assume primacy of capacity we may expect 
(H6b) large agencies in practice to perceive themselves as being subject to less 
regulation and control than small agencies.  
Third, we will expect internal agency culture to affect the degree of regulation and 
control. Agencies with a strong professional culture underlining expertise and 
professional quality will generally perceive themselves as being subject to less regulation 
and control than other agencies (H7). 
Database and methodology2 
In the formal structural arrangements of the Norwegian state apparatus the form of 
affiliation is a crucial feature for determining whether an organization is part of the civil 
service or not. At the national level the civil service is divided into quite small ministries 
with directorates/central agencies, other ordinary public administration bodies, agencies 
with extended authority, and government administrative enterprises, all outside the 
                                                 
2 This section draws on Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen (2005). 
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ministries but reporting to a ministry. Civil service organizations at the regional or local 
level may report either directly to a ministry or through an organization at the national 
level. All civil service organizations are, legally speaking, government entities subject to 
ministerial directions and subordinated to ministerial control. In contrast to state-owned 
companies, civil service organizations are regulated through the state budget, the state 
collective wage agreement, the state pension scheme, the Freedom of Information Act, 
and the administrative law. Some agencies and all government administrative enterprises 
are given enhanced budgetary leeway (Lægreid et al. 2003). In short, the form of 
affiliation grants different sets of formal constraints or freedom of action within a more 
general regulative framework. 
In Norway, agencies outside the ministries represent the largest share of the civil 
service. In 2003 only a small percentage of civil servants were employed by ministries 
(about 3,900). In comparison, about 120,000 civil servants (including those at the 
regional and local levels) were employed by directorates/central agencies, other ordinary 
public administration bodies, agencies with extended authority, and government 
administrative enterprises. This number decreased from 185,000 in 1990, mainly due to 
the transformation of some large agencies and administrative enterprises into state-
owned companies outside the civil service (e.g., Norwegian State Railways, the 
Norwegian Power Company, Telenor, the Norwegian Post and the airport 
administration). 
The database used in this paper is a survey addressed to all organizations in the civil 
service outside the ministries in 2004 – i.e., organizations that are part of the state as a 
legal entity and report to one or more ministries. It excludes ministries, local 
government, state-owned companies and governmental foundations. The civil service 
organizations are divided into sub-forms of affiliation. As of 2004 there were 57 
directorates/central agencies, 125 other public administration bodies, 28 agencies with 
extended authority, and 5 government administrative enterprises. 
The population of organizations consists of three different agency types. First, all single 
national civil service organizations without subordinate units, comprising 107 bodies 
(e.g., the National Competition Authority, the Directorate for Nature Management, and 
the Data Inspectorate). Second, integrated civil service organizations consisting of a 
national unit as well as subordinated regional or local branches (e.g., the Norwegian Tax 
Administration, Norwegian Customs and Excise, and the Norwegian Labour Inspection 
Authority). All of these 40 units are included in the population, and they were asked to 
answer on behalf of the whole organization. Third, all single regional units in groups of 
similar civil service organizations in different geographical areas, reporting directly to 
one or more ministries (e.g., county governors, colleges etc.). These groups comprise 68 
bodies covering specific parts of the county. 
All in all, the population adds up to 215 civil service organizations. One 
questionnaire was sent to each agency, and a central manager was asked to answer on 
behalf of the whole organization. The questionnaire was an adaptation of a similar 
survey carried out in Belgium (Flanders) in 2002–2003 (Verhoest, Verschuere and 
REGULAT ING  REGULATORY  ORGANIZATIONS:  … WORKING PAPER  5  -  2005  
 17 
Bouckaert 2003).3 It was rather comprehensive, covering organizational characteristics, 
autonomy dimensions, regulation and control relationships, and organizational culture 
(Lægreid et al. 2004). A total of 150 organizations answered the survey, which 
constitutes a response rate of 70 %. There are only small variations in the response rate 
according to sub-form of affiliation and type of agency and between different ministerial 
areas. For half of the ministerial areas the response rate was over 80 % and none was 
below 50 %. Thus, our conclusion is that the respondents are quite representative for 
the population of Norwegian state agencies. 
The dependent variables we will use in this paper are different dimensions of 
regulation and control, as perceived by the civil service organizations. We will 
distinguish between who controls, what is controlled, and how control is carried out. To 
describe and explain the degree of and variation in perceived regulation and control we 
will primarily use univariate frequencies and bivariate correlations (summed up by 
measures like Pearson’s r). For dependent variables where task has a significant bivariate 
correlation, we also use multivariate analyses including other independent variables 
having significant bivariate correlations. 
Regulatory tasks and agencies 
We define regulatory agencies in the civil service as those agencies that perform 
regulatory tasks. Thus, we first have to clarify what constitutes a regulatory task, and we 
then have to decide whether these types of tasks are included in the task portfolio of the 
agencies. How can we decide whether regulatory tasks are included in the task portfolio 
of state agencies? One option is to take rules and standards as a point of departure and 
look for civil service organizations that monitor, scrutinize or enforce these rules and 
standards. Another option is to take civil service organizations as a point of departure 
and decide whether regulation is among their tasks, either based on their own judgment 
or the judgment of outsiders, like researchers. In a previous study of Norwegian civil 
service organizations we defined the task portfolio of each unit ourselves (cf. Rolland, 
Roness and Rubecksen 2001, Rubecksen 2004). This time, however, we let the 
respondents decide. 
As in the previous study, a predefined set of tasks was used. For each unit, one task 
was singled out as the primary task, but the unit could also have one or more secondary 
tasks. Taken together, these primary and secondary tasks form the task portfolio of a civil 
service organization. In classifying types of tasks, a main distinction was drawn between 
tasks involving the exercise of public authority and those involving service delivery or 
production. Owing to their specific and circumscribed nature regulation and scrutiny were 
singled out as a separate category distinct from other kinds of exercising public authority. For 
service delivery and production, a distinction was made between tasks primarily carried 
out on a non-profit basis (general public services), and those subject to market conditions 
                                                 
3 The questionnaire is part of the «Comparative Public Organization Data Base for Research and Analysis – Network» 
(COBRA). More information on the COBRA network is available on the Internet: 
http://www.publicmanagement-cobra.org/ 
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(business and industrial services). In addition, policy formulation (policy shaping and advice) was 
included as a fifth category. 
In the questionnaire we specified that regulation and scrutiny were closely related to 
follow-up or control via rules, laws and agreements and might cover qualitatively 
different tasks (inspection, supervision and control). In addition, regulation and scrutiny 
were deemed to be directed towards other agents or institutions than the organization 
performing these tasks. Whether organizations had the right of enforcement was not a 
necessary condition. Three examples were specified as belonging to this category: the 
Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway, the Norwegian Food Safety 
Authority, and the Office of the Gender Equality Ombudsman. However, it was up to 
each agency to decide whether regulation and scrutiny was their primary task, a 
secondary task, or not included in their task portfolio at all. 
Overall, the survey yielded the following distribution of primary tasks: regulation and 
scrutiny, 23 %; exercising other kinds of authority, 25 %; general public services, 45 %; 
business and industrial services, 5 %; and policy formulation, 3 %. Regulation and 
scrutiny were mentioned as a secondary task by 26 % of all units (and by 34 % of the 
units with other types of primary tasks). The occurrence of regulation and scrutiny as a 
secondary task was particularly frequent among units that perceived exercising other 
kinds of authority as their primary task (58 %), while few of the units that saw service 
delivery or production as their primary task (20 %) included regulation and scrutiny in 
their task portfolio. 
In the following discussion, we define regulatory agencies either as those units that 
have regulation and scrutiny as their primary task (23 %) or as part of their task 
portfolio (49 %).  
What, then, distinguishes regulatory agencies from other types of state agencies? One 
criterion is structural features. Table 1 shows that all agencies whose primary task is 
regulation and 90 % of those for whom regulation is a secondary task are ordinary civil 
service organizations. By contrast, about one quarter of the agencies with no regulatory 
tasks have other sub-forms of affiliation. 
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Table 1. Agency tasks and structural features. Percentages.  
 Tasks  
 
Regulation as 
primary task 
Regulation as 
secondary task 
No regulative tasks Total 
Form of affiliation     
- Ordinary agencies 100 90 76 85 
- Other agencies 0 10 24 15 
Type of agency     
- National agencies 39 50 57 51 
- Integrated 
agencies 
21 26 15 19 
- Regional agencies 39 24 28 30 
Policy area4     
- Economy 18 13 12 13 
- Welfare 27 34 68 50 
- Other 55 53 20 37 
 N 33 38 75 146 
  
With regard to agency type, a smaller proportion of agencies for whom regulation is 
their primary task are national agencies than those where regulation is either their 
secondary task or not included in their task portfolio. Regional agencies whose primary 
task is regulation are mainly county governors, who are responsible for monitoring, 
supervising and scrutinizing the municipalities. Finally, with regard to policy area, 
agencies for which regulation is their primary task are somewhat over-represented in 
economic policy areas and heavily under-represented in welfare policy areas. Agencies 
for which regulation is a secondary task are also under-represented in welfare policy 
areas. Overall, of those agencies including regulation in their task portfolio more than 
half operate in areas other than economy and welfare. This includes county governors as 
well as some other agencies that were transferred to the Ministry of Labour and 
Government Administration as part of the government’s modernization program. 
Table 2 shows the relationships between tasks and cultural features of state agencies. 
With regard to age, only about one quarter of agencies engaged in regulation as their 
                                                 
4 The three categories comprise the following ministries: a) Economy: Fisheries; Agriculture; Trade and Industry; Oil 
and Energy; Transport and Communications. b) Welfare: Children and Family Affairs; Education and Research; 
Church and Culture; Social Affairs; Health. c) Others: Labour and Government Administration; Finance; Justice 
and Police; Local Government and Regional Development; Environment; Foreign Affairs; Defence; Prime 
Minister’s Office. 
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primary task are younger that 15 years, compared with almost half of the agencies 
without regulation in their task portfolio 
Table 2. Agency tasks and cultural features. Percentages.  
 Tasks  
Cultural features 
Regulation as 
primary task 
Regulation as 
secondary task 
No regulative 
tasks 
Total 
Agency age     
Established before 1990 73 61 55 60 
Established 1990 or later 27 39 45 40 
Agency size     
200 employees and more 13 43 50 40 
50–199 employees 66 38 18 34 
Fewer than 50 employees  22 19 32 27 
Professional quality5     
Very good  39 43 29 35 
Good or less 61 57 71 65 
N, average 33 37 74 144 
 
 A large majority of the agencies for whom regulation is their primary task are medium-
sized (between 50 and 200 employees), while half of the agencies without regulation in 
their task portfolio are large. Finally, with regard to administrative culture, a larger 
proportion of the agencies with regulation in their task portfolio perceive their 
professional quality as very good than those without regulation.  
Summing up, agencies whose primary task is regulation are more often ordinary civil 
service organizations, regional agencies, in policy areas other than economy and welfare, 
older than 15 years, medium-sized, and perceiving their professional quality as very 
good than agencies with no regulatory tasks.  
Regulating regulatory agencies 
In this section we will present our findings concerning whether regulatory agencies are 
different from other agencies with regard to who controls, what is controlled, and how 
                                                 
5 The agencies were asked to assess 16 aspects of their organizational culture, including professional quality, along a 
scale: 1) very bad, 2) bad, 3) medium, 4) good, and 5) very good.  
REGULAT ING  REGULATORY  ORGANIZATIONS:  … WORKING PAPER  5  -  2005  
 21 
control is carried out.6 Our main hypothesis (H1) is that agencies with regulatory tasks 
generally will perceive themselves as subject to less regulation and control than agencies 
with other types of tasks.  
Who contro ls?  
State agencies interact with different types of other organizations that potentially may 
regulate and control the agencies. In the questionnaire we focused on what we think are 
the most relevant bodies. For central government these include the parent ministry, the 
Ministry of Finance, and governmental supervisory bodies. In addition to the 
parliament, two bodies related to the legislature are included: the Office of the Auditor 
General and the Parliament’s Ombudsman for public administration. Independent 
courts of appeal/review boards are outside the courts, and are normally related to 
specific agencies. At the international level, the ESA (EFTA’s surveillance agency) is 
treated separately, since although Norway is outside the EU, it is still part of EFTA. 
Private accreditation/standardization organizations may be national or international. 
Likewise, the mass media may be domestic or foreign. We also included the 
organization itself, to be able to compare internal vs. external control. 
For each of these bodies the agencies were asked whether they were very important, 
important, or not important with regard to audit, control or regulation of the 
organization. The organization itself scored highest of all: none of the agencies said that 
it was not important and 72 % said it was very important. The parent ministry is the 
external body that is assessed as most important: 44 % of the agencies say that the 
parent ministry is very important, 53 % that it is important, and only 3 % that it is not 
important in auditing, controlling and regulating the agencies. The Auditor General 
scores about equally high: 39 % very important, 55 % important and 6 % not important. 
The mass media, the parliament and the Ministry of Finance are also assessed as being 
very important or important by at least every second agency. On the other hand, private 
accreditation/standardization organizations, the courts, independent courts/boards of 
appeal, the ESA, and other international organizations are assessed as not being 
important by at least three out of four agencies.  
Whether agency type makes a difference to how the agencies perceive the importance 
of various bodies is summed up in Table 3.  
                                                 
6 In the tables we include all three values of the independent variable (regulation as primary task, regulation as 
secondary task, and no regulatory tasks), but only percentages for one value of the dependent variables. 
Correlations are based on Pearson’s r, where the independent variable is dichotomized (regulation as primary or 
secondary task vs. no regulatory task) and the dependent variables may have two or three values.  
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Table 3. Importance of bodies in auditing/controlling/regulating the agencies. Percentages reporting 
«very important».  
«WHO» Regulation as primary task 
Regulation as secondary 
task No regulative tasks Total 
Organization itself 
 
55 79 75 72 
The office of the Auditor General 
 
42 42 36 39 
Parent Ministry 
 
58 54 33   44 ** 
Ministry of Finance 
 
10 5 6  6 * 
Independent court of appeal/review 
board 
 
10 8 3 6 
Governmental supervisory 
body/regulatory body 
 
3 5 4 4 
The courts 
 
6 0 7 5 
Ombud/The Parliament’s 
Ombudsman for public adm. 
 
19 3 4  7 * 
The parliament 
 
18 21 18 19 
ESA (EFTA’s surveillance authority) 
 
3 3 3 3 
Other international organizations 
 
7 11 4 7 
Private accreditation/ 
standardization organizations 
 
0 3 6 4 
Mass media 9 19 9  12 * 
N, average 31 38 71 141 
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Agency task has a significant effect on the perceptions of four external bodies: the mass 
media, the Parliament’s Ombudsman, the Ministry of Finance, and particularly the 
parent ministry. However, contrary to our main hypothesis, regulatory agencies seem to 
be controlled by these bodies to a larger extent than non-regulatory agencies. The 
Parliament’s Ombudsman is particularly relevant for agencies with regulation as their 
primary task. 
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 Since the parent ministry is quite important in controlling the agencies, it is of 
relevance to examine who is involved in developing regulations and precepts within the 
organization’s field of responsibility. Here, 20% of the agencies report that the parent 
ministry undertakes this task on its own, 3 % that the agency does this alone, and 77 % 
that both the parent ministry and the agency are involved in the development of 
regulations and precepts. Thus, while the parent ministry does control the agencies, this 
is not a one-way relationship. Rather, most agencies are involved in the development of 
regulations. Even if regulatory agencies are somewhat more involved in this 
development than non-regulatory agencies, the bivariate correlation is not significant. 
 For some of the external bodies, we also asked to what extent the agencies had 
been subject to regulation and control during the past five years. The parliament may 
interfere in a number of ways: by making changes in the Government’s budget 
proposals; by posing questions to the minister during Question Time or through 
interpellations; by initiating investigations and scrutinies; or (more recently) through 
public hearings and inquiries. Overall, 10 % of the agencies reported that this had 
happened to a large extent, 39 % to some extent, and 51 % to a small or no extent. 
However, as shown in Table 4, there are only minor differences according to agency 
task.  
Table 4. Control from other bodies during the past five years. Percentages reporting interference or 
review.  
 Regulation as primary task 
Regulation as 
secondary task 
No regulative 
tasks Total 
Parliament 42 50 52 49 
Courts 39 41 25 32 
International control bodies 16 11 14 13 
Ombud 42 35 32 35 
N, average 32 37 73 143 
 
The extent of control was less for the three other external bodies: only 13 % reported 
being reviewed by international control bodies (e.g. the ESA), 32 % by the courts and 35 
% by the Parliament’s Ombudsman. For the last two bodies, the extent of control is 
higher for regulatory agencies than for non-regulatory agencies, but the correlations are 
not significant. 
As noted above, the mass media turns out to be one of the most important external 
agents in controlling the agencies. Thus, it is of relevance to examine whether the mass 
media have criticized the agencies. More specifically, we asked to what extent the agency 
had been subject to criticism from other public units, political actors or the mass media 
due to lack of conformity/correspondence with political objectives and preferences 
during the past five years. Here, 26 % reported that this had not occurred, 43 % that it 
had occurred to a very small extent, 28 % to some extent, and only 4 % to a very large 
extent. Even though a larger proportion of non-regulatory agencies than regulatory 
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agencies reported not having been criticized at all or only to a very small extent the 
correlation between agency tasks and external criticism is not significant. 
Summing up our findings on whether regulatory agencies are different from other 
agencies concerning who controls them, the principal result is that they perceive more 
regulation and control than other agencies, particularly from their parent ministry, but 
also from the mass media, the Ministry of Finance, and the Parliament’s Ombudsman. 
However, most of the regulatory agencies are involved in the development of 
regulations and precepts within their fields of responsibility, indicating a two-way 
relationship between the agencies and their parent ministry.  
What is  contro l led? 
 The external bodies may regulate and control different aspects of the activities of the 
agencies. In the questionnaire we specified nine aspects, and asked the agencies whether 
each of them was subject to audit/control/regulation or not. Thus, positive answers on 
several aspects were possible. Overall, as shown in Table 5, budgeting and accounting, 
and financial management scored highest, while cost effectiveness and personnel 
matters scored lowest.  
However, agency task only makes a difference for two aspects: administrative 
performance and the organization’s follow-up on general guidelines and policies issued 
by political authorities. Here, too, contrary to our main hypothesis, regulatory agencies 
seem to be controlled more often than non-regulatory agencies.  
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Table 5. Aspects of the organization’s activities subject to audit/control/regulation. Percentages 
reporting specific aspects. 
 «WHAT» Regulation as primary task 
Regulation as 
secondary task 
No regulative 
tasks 
 
Total 
 
Administrative performance 
 
73 79 60  68* 
Financial management  
 
91 92 81 86 
Personnel matters 
 
33 58 41 43 
Cost effectiveness 
 
9 42 20 23 
Level of goal achievement 
 
55 68 62 62 
The organization’s enforcement of – and compliance with 
– general rules, regulations and precepts 
 
61 68 51 58 
Budgeting and accounting 
 
85 95 84 87 
The organization’s follow-up on general guidelines and 
policies issued by political authorities 
 
61 68 47  56 * 
Internal control systems 55 50 53 52 
N, average 33 38 74 145 
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level. (2-tailed) 
How to  contro l?  
The external bodies may also regulate and control state agencies in different ways. In the 
questionnaire we specified five ways and asked the agencies whether they had been 
subject to each of them during the past five years.  
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Table 6. Focus of audit/control/regulation during the past five years. Percentages 
During the past five years the organization has been 
subject to: 
Regulation as 
primary task 
Regulation as 
secondary task No regulative tasks Total 
Performance audit  
 
59 65 42  52 * 
Critical review or comments from The Office 
of the Auditor General 
 
30 46 41 40 
Routine inspections by governmental 
supervisory /regulatory bodies 
 
48 50 51 50 
Non-routine inspections by governmental 
supervisory regulatory bodies 
 
18 11 18 16 
Audit/control/regulation by private 
accreditation/standardization organizations 
6 8 14 11 
N, average 33 38 72 143 
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Overall, as shown in Table 6, performance audit and financial audit by the Auditor 
General and routine inspection by governmental supervisory or regulatory bodies were 
most widespread, while audit, control or regulation by private accredi-
tation/standardization organizations and non-routine inspections by governmental 
supervisory/regulatory bodies were quite uncommon. However, agency task only makes 
a difference for performance audit. Again, contrary to our main hypothesis, regulatory 
agencies seem to be subject to more regulation and control than other agencies. 
 
Overall assessment. Some external bodies (particularly the Auditor General and the 
parent ministry) are perceived as more important than others in controlling the agencies. 
In addition, some aspects of the agencies’ activities (particularly budgeting and 
accounting, and financial management) are perceived as being subject to more 
regulation and control than others; while some ways of exercising regulation and control 
(particularly performance audits and routine inspections) have been more widespread 
than others. We also found that agency task makes a difference for the importance of 
four external bodies controlling the agency (e.g. the parent ministry), two aspects of 
what is controlled (e.g. administrative performance), and one means of exercising 
control (performance audit). For all these seven indicators of control, however, the 
relationships are in the opposite direction to what our main hypothesis (H1) led us to 
expect.  
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The importance of structural and 
cultural features 
In this section we will discuss the importance of structural and cultural features and 
check whether the seven significant bivariate correlations between agency task and 
perceived regulation and control hold when these factors are accounted for. Based on 
the findings for the seven indicators of control we will also discuss the remaining 
hypotheses (H2-H7), but we will not test them fully using all indicators of who controls 
and what is controlled and how. 
 
Who controls? With regard to control from external bodies there are, for the four 
bodies where agency task makes a difference, four significant bivariate correlations 
between structural or cultural features and perceptions of their importance. 
 
• Agency type is related to control by the Parliament’s Ombudsman: national 
agencies perceive less control than regional and integrated agencies, contrary to 
H3. 
• Form of affiliation is related to control by the Parliament’s Ombudsman: 
ordinary agencies perceive more control than other agencies, in accordance with 
H4.  
• Form of affiliation is also related to control by the mass media: ordinary 
agencies perceive less control than other agencies, contrary to H4.  
• Agency age is related to control by the parent ministry: older agencies perceive 
more control than younger agencies, contrary to H5.  
 
What is controlled? Agency task makes a difference for administrative performance 
and the follow-up on general guidelines and policies issued by the political authorities. 
Here, there are only significant bivariate correlations between the latter indicator of 
what is controlled and one of the other potential explanatory factors: 
 
• Small agencies perceive less control of follow-up than large agencies, in 
accordance with H6a. 
 
How to control? Here, agency task only makes a difference for performance audit. 
Two other variables also have significant bivariate correlations with agencies’ being 
subject to performance audit during the past five years: 
 
• National agencies have been subject to performance audit to a lesser extent than 
regional and integrated agencies, contrary to H3. 
• Small agencies have been subject to performance audit to a lesser extent than 
large agencies, in accordance with H6a. 
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With regard to the independent variables (and related hypotheses) neither policy area 
(H2) nor professional quality (H7) seems to make any significant difference for the 
relevant indicators of control. For agency type (H3) and agency age (H5) the only 
significant bivariate correlations are in the opposite direction to what was expected, 
while form of affiliation (H4) provide mixed results. If we assume primacy of 
homogeneous identity, two of our observations are in accordance with the hypothesis 
based on agency size (H6a)  
Mult ivar iate  analys is   
We now turn to the relative explanatory power of the different independent variables on 
perceptions of control.7  
                                                 
7 Only variables with significant bivariate correlations are included in the analysis.   
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Table 7. Summary of regression analysis by task-specific, structural and cultural features affecting 
perception of control. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear regressions. 
 
Who controls? What is controlled? How to control? 
 Parent Ministry 
Ministry of 
Finance 
The 
Parliament’s 
Ombudsman 
Mass 
media 
Administrative 
performance 
Follow-up on 
policies 
Performance 
audit 
Tasks:        
- Regulation .21 * .20 * .14 .25 ** .18 * .17 * .20 * 
Structural features:        
- Form of affiliation - - -.15 .27 ** - - - 
- Agency type - -  .20 * - - - .04 
- Policy area - - - - - - - 
Cultural features:        
- Agency age  .18 * - - - - - - 
- Agency size - - - - -  .18 *  .29 ** 
- Professional culture - - - - - - - 
Multiple R .29  .20 .33 .32 .18  .24  .37  
R2 .08 .04 .11 .10 .03 .06 .13 
Adjusted R2 .07 .03 .09 .09 .02 .05 .11 
F Statistics 6.347 6.074 5.513 7.535 4.639 4.373 6.942 
Significance of F .002  .015  .001 .001 .033  .014  .000  
** Significant at the 0.01 level; * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); – Not included in the analysis 
The multivariate analyses generally confirm the main pattern revealed in the bivariate 
analyses. One general finding from the multivariate analysis, summed up in Table 7, is 
that the independent variables explain only a small part of the variation in the dependent 
variables. After controlling for structural and cultural features, agency task still makes a 
significant difference for most of the seven indicators of control, but in the opposite 
direction to that suggested by our main hypothesis (H1). Most of the other significant 
bivariate correlations also hold when other independent variables are controlled for, but 
the direction of the correlation corresponds with our hypotheses in only a few instances.  
Summing up, the explanatory power of our perspectives is relatively weak, but we 
find some significant effects from agency task as well as from some structural and 
cultural features. 
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Conclusion: Regulatory agencies 
revisited 
In this paper we have first shown that regulatory tasks represent a major activity for 
government agencies in Norway. In spite of a trend towards «single-purpose 
organizations» in administrative and regulatory reforms, combining regulatory tasks with 
other tasks in the same agency is still quite widespread. Close to half of the agencies 
have regulation as a primary or a secondary task. Thus, the label «regulatory state» seems 
to fit well when we look at the task portfolio of Norwegian state agencies. Regulatory 
bodies are, however, not particularly young organizations, indicating that the regulatory 
state has a long trajectory in Norway.  
Second, we have revealed that the regulatory agencies are organized in various ways: 
as national agencies without local branches; as integrated agencies consisting of a 
national unit as well as subordinated regional or local branches; and as regional agencies 
reporting directly to a ministry. They are represented in all types of policy areas, and not 
only or primarily in the areas of economy and welfare.  
Third, when it comes to the question of who controls, we find that the agencies report 
a large number of important control bodies. According to the principle of internal 
control and self-regulation inside government, which has been in force in the 
Norwegian public sector over the past two decades, it is not surprising that the 
organization itself is a very important controlling body, while among the external 
control bodies, the parent ministry and the Ministry of Finance are especially important. 
Thus, the hierarchy seems to work very well. Rule-making and the formulation of 
regulations is, however, a joint effort of agencies and their parent ministry. In addition, 
the parliament as well as its controlling bodies, the Ombudsman and the Auditor 
General, seem to play an important role in auditing, controlling and regulating the 
agencies. Moreover, they are also subject to public scrutiny from the mass media. On 
the other hand, the courts, international control bodies and private accreditation 
organizations seem to be of relatively little importance. 
Fourth, concerning what is controlled and how, budgeting, accounting and financial 
management issues are the primary areas for scrutiny. Administrative and financial 
performance seem to be under tighter audit and control than personnel matters, cost 
effectiveness, and compliance to general rules and policy guidelines. Performance audit 
and financial audit by the Auditor General as well as routine inspections by the 
regulatory and supervisory bodies are the main instruments of control. Thus, the scope 
of who regulates the regulators is rather wide, while the scope of what is regulated and 
how is rather narrow.  
Fifth, when it comes to variations between regulatory agencies and other agencies in 
perceived regulation and control, the main picture is that there are more similarities than 
differences according to agency task, a finding that also applies to different dimensions 
of autonomy and other control features (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2005). One 
reason for this might be that many agencies have several roles and combine regulatory 
activities with other types of tasks. Thus, the agencies are more often hybrids than 
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«single-purpose organizations». There are, however, some significant differences. 
Regulatory agencies are more controlled by their parent ministry than other agencies, 
and they are also monitored by the Ministry of Finance, the Parliament’s Ombudsman 
and the mass media, at least according to their own assessment. Control by the 
Parliament’s Ombudsman is particularly pronounced for agencies having regulation as 
their primary task, while control by the mass media is most widespread for agencies 
having regulation as a secondary task. We have also revealed that administrative 
performance, performance audit and the agencies’ follow-up on general guidelines and 
policies issued by political authorities are scrutinized more in regulatory agencies than in 
other agencies.  
Sixth, we also find some significant effects from structural features like agency type, 
and form of affiliation, and from cultural features like agency age and agency size. Thus, 
there is no one-factor explanation for variation in how the agencies perceived regulation 
and control. There is a need to blend the perspectives (cf. Lægreid, Roness and 
Rubecksen 2005). However, in general, the explanatory power of our perspectives is 
relatively weak, and we are not able to explain much of the variance in the dependent 
variables. 
What, then, are the practical and theoretical implications of these findings? Overall, 
the regulatory agencies are subject to stronger control and audit than other agencies. 
This is a surprising finding that goes against our main hypothesis and is also at odds 
with the general regulatory reform movement espoused by the OECD and the 
Norwegian government, which aims to give the regulatory agencies more autonomy 
from the ministry. We find, instead, that the regulatory agencies are actually relatively 
tightly controlled by their parent ministry, by the legislature and by the mass media. 
Thus, the answer to our question of who regulates the regulators is «quite a few» in the 
executive, the legislature and the general public. A main finding, therefore, is that the 
new regulatory doctrine of more autonomous regulatory agencies at arm’s length from 
the ministry and from the legislature has so far not been put into practice.  
One reason for this may be that in Norway not all components of regulation, such as 
standard-setting and rule-making, monitoring, enforcement and the application of 
sanctions, are delegated to the regulatory agencies. The normal situation is that these 
functions are split between different organizations and levels, including agencies, 
ministries and legislative bodies. It is therefore important not only to focus on individual 
regulatory agencies in isolation but also to see them as part of a broader institutional 
constellation (Jordana and Sancho 2004).  
The loose coupling between the new regulatory doctrine and actual regulatory 
practice can also be seen as a consequence of the mismatch between the rather technical 
and apolitical flavour of the new regulatory reforms and the more political situation that 
the regulators face in practice. Moving regulatory decision-making to autonomous 
agencies involves not only non-political technical and technocratic efficiency, but also 
sensitive political trade-offs and value-based choices concerning economic efficiency, 
effectiveness, performance, safety, security and social and environmental objectives like 
equity, fairness, political control and professional autonomy, shifting power relations, 
legitimacy and accountability. Such trade-offs are often unstable and ambiguous and 
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have clear political components that cannot easily be addressed using purely technical 
criteria (Jordana and Sancho 2004).  
 Summing up, after a decade of administrative and regulatory reforms aimed at 
increasing the autonomy of agencies in general and regulatory agencies in particular, the 
agencies still report a lot of regulation and control. The regulatory authorities do not 
react quickly to new regulatory policy signals and there seems to be a lot of robustness, 
reluctance and path dependencies when it comes to regulation and control of civil 
service organizations. We have focused especially on who controls and what is 
controlled and how. The lesson is that the traditional control and regulatory style 
associated with a parliamentary system involving ministerial responsibility and a strong 
tradition of transparency and a critical press is still dominant in the Norwegian 
government system. The parent ministry, the Ministry of Finance, the legislature and its 
controlling bodies and the mass media are the main actors here, while the focus is on 
financial management, budgeting, accounting, performance audit and administrative 
performance. Thus, there is a lot of regulation inside government in which government 
officials oversee the work of other bureaucrats using rules on how public bodies should 
operate that have been formulated within the government. While the agencies may have 
more autonomy from the ministries, they also face an expansion in oversight both from 
traditional ex ante authorization and from newer ex post audit and assessment measures. 
The old forms of regulation and control do not fade away in the new regulatory state; 
rather, they are supplemented by new instruments of control, resulting in a more 
complex regulatory regime. Generally our findings confirm earlier studies revealing the 
upgrading of legislative control and the revitalization of the Audit Office through the 
introduction of performance audits from the mid-1990s on (Christensen, Helgesen and 
Lægreid 2001, Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Christensen, Lægreid and Roness 2002).  
This rather extensive regulatory activity does not, however, mean that the agencies 
have little autonomy. On the contrary, they also report a high degree of autonomy 
(Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2005). This indicates that autonomy and control might 
not be two extremes on the same dimension, but rather two relatively independent 
dimensions. What is gained in autonomy is not necessary lost in control. In practice, 
autonomy and control often go hand-in-hand, and under certain conditions increased 
autonomy does not necessarily mean decreased control (Fimreite and Lægreid 2005). 
Both autonomy and control can increase or decrease simultaneously, e.g. increased 
autonomy through deregulation and structural devolution can correspond with 
increased control through new routines of reporting, monitoring and auditing 
(Westerberg and Forssell 2005). Thus, there might be a dynamic relationship between 
autonomy and control, and we might see a trend in which both autonomy and the 
control of agencies increases. 
In this paper we have focused on regulation as an external means of control of 
formal organizations. The increase in the autonomy of formal organizations in the 
public sector has produced a greater need for more formal external control (Brunsson 
and Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Deregulation has produced a large number of autonomous 
formal organizations, and this in turn increases the need for regulation and for 
regulatory agencies. Thus, agencification and regulation go in tandem (Christensen and 
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Lægreid 2005a). Autonomous organizations need regulation and regulation needs 
autonomous organizations.  
Literature 
Baldwin, R., C. Scott and C. Hood, eds. (1998) A Reader on Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Boston, J., J, Martin, J. Pallot and P. Walsh (1996) Public Management – The New Zealand Model. Auckland: 
Oxford University Press. 
Brunsson, N. and K. Sahlin-Andersson (2000) «Constructing Organizations: The Example of Public 
Sector Reform», Organizational Studies, 21: 721–746. 
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (1998) «Administrative Reform Policy: The Case of Norway.» International 
Review of Administrative Sciences, 64: 457–475. 
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid, eds. (2001) New Public Management. The Transformation of Ideas and Practice. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2002) Reformer og lederskap. Omstilling i den utøvende makt (Reforms and 
Leadership. Renewal in the Executive Power). Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. 
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2003) «Coping with Complex Leadership Roles: The Problematic 
Redefinition of Government-Owned Enterprises.» Public Administration, 81: 803–831. 
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2004a) «Governmental Autonomization and Control: The Norwegian 
Way», Public Administration and Development, 24: 129–135. 
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2004b) «Regulatory Agencies – the Challenges of Balancing Agency 
Autonomy and Political Control.» Paper presented at the 20th Anniversary Conference of the Structure 
and Organization of Government Research Committee of the International Political Science 
Association, Vancouver, June 15–17, 2004.  
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2005a) «Agencification and regulatory reform.» Paper presented at the 
SCANCOR/SOG workshop on «Autonomization of the state: From integrated administrative models 
to single purpose organizations.» Stanford University, April 1–2, 2005. 
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2005b) «Trust in Government – the relative importance of service 
satisfaction, political factors and demography», Public Performance & Management Review. (forthcoming) 
Christensen, T. and P.G. Roness (1999) «Den historiske arven – Norge» (The historical legacy – Norway). 
In P. Lægreid and O.K. Pedersen, eds. Fra opbygning til ombygning i staten. Copenhagen: Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag. 
Christensen, T., S.B. Helgesen and P. Lægreid (2001) «En revitalisert riksrevisjon» (A revitalized Audit 
Office). In B.S. Tranøy and Ø. Østerud, eds. Den fragmenterte staten – reformer, makt og styring. Oslo: 
Gyldendal Akademisk. 
Christensen, T., P. Lægreid and P.G. Roness (2002) «Increasing Parliamentary Control of the Executive? 
New Instruments and Emerging Effects», Journal of Legislative Studies, 8: 37–62. 
Egeberg, M. (2003) «How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective.» In B.G. Peters 
and J. Pierre, eds. Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage. 
Fimreite, A.L. and P. Lægreid (2005) «The regulatory state and the executing municipalitiy – 
Consequences of public sector reform in Norway.» Paper to be presented at the 21st EGOS 
Colloquium in Berlin, June 30 – July 2, 2005. Sub theme no. 15 «Institutional Change and 
Transformation of Public Organizations.» 
Flinders, M. (2004) «Distributed Public Governance in Britain.» Public Administration, 82: 883–909. 
Gilardi, F. (2004) «Institutional change in regulatory policies: regulation through independent agencies and 
the three new institutionalisms.» In J. Jordana and D. Levi-Faur, eds. The Politics of Regulation. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
WORKING PAPER  5  -  2005 REGULAT ING  REGULATORY  ORGANIZATIONS:  … 
34 
Gregory, R. (2003) «All the King’s Horses and all the King’s Men: Putting New Zealand’s Public Sector 
Back Together Again», International Public Management Review, 4: 41–58. 
Grønlie, T. (1999) Forvaltning for politikk (Administration and politics). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Grønlie, T. (2001) «Mellom politikk og marked – organisering av statlig næringsdrift» (Between politics 
and market – organizing state industry). In B.S. Tranøy and Ø. Østerud, eds. Den fragmenterte staten – 
reformer, makt og styring. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. 
Gulick, L. (1937) «Notes on the Theory of Organizations. With Special Reference to Government.» In L. 
Gulick and L. Urwick, eds. Papers on the Science of Administration. New York: A.M. Kelley. 
Hood, C., H. Rothstein and R. Baldwin (2001) The Government of Risk. Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hood, C., C. Scott, O. James, G. Jones and T. Travers (1999) Regulation inside government: waste watchers, 
quality police and sleaze-busters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Jacobsson, B. (1984) Hur styrs forvaltningen? Myt och verklighet kring departementens styrning av Ämbetsverken 
(How is the Civil Service steered? Myth and Reality on the Control of the Agencies by the Ministries). 
Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Jacobsson, B., P. Lægreid and O.K. Pedersen (2003). Europeanization and Transnational States. Comparing 
Nordic Central Governments. London: Routledge. 
James, O. (2000) «Regulation inside government: Public interest justification and regulatory failures», 
Public Administration, 78: 327–343. 
Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (2004) «The Politics of Regulation in the Age of Governance.» In J. Jordana 
and D. Levi-Faur, eds. The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reform in the Age of Governance. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Jordana, J. and D. Sancho (2004) «Regulatory design, institutional constellations and the study of the 
regulatory state.» In J. Jordana and D. Levi-Faur, eds. The Politics of Regulation. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Krasner, S. (1988) «Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective», Comparative Political Studies, 21: 66–94. 
Lægreid, P., P.G. Roness and K. Rubecksen (2005) «Autonomy and control in the Norwegian civil 
service: does agency form matter?» Paper presented at the SCANCOR/SOG workshop on 
«Autonomization of the state: From integrated administrative models to single purpose organizations.» 
Stanford University, April 1–2, 2005. 
Lægreid, P., V.W. Rolland, P.G. Roness and J.-E. Ågotnes (2003). «The structural autonomy of the 
Norwegian State 1947–2003.» Bergen: Rokkan Centre, Working Paper 12/2003. 
Lægreid, P., V.W. Rolland, P.G. Roness, K. Rubecksen and J.-E. Ågotnes (2004) «State organizations and 
agencies: A description of the Norwegian survey on organizational autonomy, steering and control.» 
Paper prepared for the Dublin Agencies’ Seminar, Dublin, December 2–3, 2004. 
Majone, G. (1997) «From the Positive to the Regulatory State – Causes and Consequences from Changes 
in the Modes of Governance», Journal of Public Policy, 17: 139–167. 
Majone, G. (2001) «Two Logics of Delegation», European Union Politics, 2: 103–122. 
Majone, G. (2002) «Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity», European Law Journal, 8: 319–339. 
March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free 
Press. 
March, J.G. and H.A. Simon (1958) Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
OECD (1997) Report on Regulatory Reform. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2002) Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries. From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance. Paris: 
OECD. 
OECD (2003) Norway: Preparing for the future now. Paris: OECD. 
Pierre, J. (2004) «Central agencies in Sweden.» In C. Pollitt and C. Talbot, eds. Unbundled Government. 
London: Routledge. 
REGULAT ING  REGULATORY  ORGANIZATIONS:  … WORKING PAPER  5  -  2005  
 35 
Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert (2004) Public Management Reform. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pollitt, C., C. Talbot, J. Caulfield and A. Smullen (2004) Agencies. How Governments do Things Through Semi-
Autonomous Organizations. London: Palgrave. 
Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society. Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rolland, V.W., P.G. Roness and K. Rubecksen (2001) Inntekter og omstillinger i statlige forvaltningsorganer ved 
tusenårsskiftet: noen foreløpige observasjoner (Incomes and renewals in civil service organizations at the start 
of the new millennium: some preliminary observations). Bergen: LOS-centre Report 0109.  
Rubecksen. K. (2004) «Civil Service Organizations in Norway: Organizational Features and Tasks.» 
Bergen: Rokkan Centre, Working Paper 20/2004 
Selznick, P. (1957) Leadership in Administration. New York: Harper & Row. 
Selznick, P. (1985) «Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation.» In R. Noll, ed. Regulatory Policy and 
the Social Sciences. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Shapiro, M. (1997) «The Problems of Independent Agencies in the United States and the European 
Union», Journal of European Public Policy, 4: 276–291. 
St.meld. nr. 17 (2002–2003) Om statlige tilsyn (On regulatory agencies). Oslo: Department of Labour and 
Government Administration. 
Thatcher, M. (2002) «Regulation after Delegation: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe», Journal of 
European Public Policy, 9: 954–959. 
Thatcher, M. and A. Stone Sweet (2002) «Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian 
Institutions», West European Politics, 25: 1–22. 
Verhoest, K., B. Verschuere and G. Bouckaert (2003) Agentschappen in Vlaanderen: een beschrijvende analyse 
(Agencies in Flanders: A descriptive analysis). Leuven: Steunpunkt Bestuurlijke Organisatie 
Vlaanderen. 
Westerberg, A.I. and A. Forssell (2005) «De-regulating and Re-regulating the Swedish Police: More 
autonomy & more control.» Paper presented at the SCANCOR/SOG workshop on «Autonomization 
of the state: From integrated administrative models to single purpose organizations.» Stanford 
University, April 1–2, 2005. 
Wilson, J.Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books. 
WORKING PAPER  5  -  2005 REGULAT ING  REGULATORY  ORGANIZATIONS:  … 
36 
WORKING PAPERS ROKKANSENTERET (ISSN 1503‐0946) 
The publications can be ordered from Rokkansenteret, tel +47 55 58 97 10, 
e‐mail: post@rokkan.uib.no, http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no 
2005 
1‐2005  Ivar A. Lima og Agnete Vabø: «Instituttstruktur og fakultetsorganisering ved HF‐fakultetet, 
Universitetet i Bergen». Mai 2005. 
2‐2005  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Modalen: Fra off‐road til on‐line på 25 år». Mai 2005. 
3‐2005  Nanna Kildal: «Fra arbeidsbegrepets historie: Aristoteles til Marx». Mai 2005. 
4‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Autonomy and Control in the Norwegian 
Civil Service: Does Agency Form Matter?». September 2005. 
5‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Regulating Regulatory Organizations: 
Controlling Norwegian Civil Service Organizations». September 2005. 
2004 
1‐2004  Dag  Olaf  Torjesen  and  Hallgeir  Gammelsæter:  «Management  Between  Autonomy  and 
Transparency in the Enterprise Hospital». January 2004.  
2‐2004  Haldor Byrkjeflot and Simon Neby: «The Decentralized Path Challenged? Nordic Health Care 
Reforms in Comparison». January 2004.  
3‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «The  Fragmented  State  –  the Challenges  of Combining 
Efficiency, Institutional Norms and Democracy». March 2004. 
4‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Europeisering av tilsynsmyndigheter i Norge og Sverige». Mars 2004. 
5‐2004  Karsten  Vrangbæk  and  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Introduction  of  Choice  in  Scandinavian 
Hospital Systems. Arguments and Policy Processes in the Danish and the Norwegian Case». 
March 2004.  
6‐2004  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Internationalization  at  Norwegian  Universities  and  Colleges  after  the 
Quality Reform». April 2004. The Globalization Program. 
7‐2004  Hans‐Tore  Hansen,  Anne  Hege  Trædal‐Henden,  Olaf  Jürgens  and  Wolfgang  Voges:  «Poverty 
among Households with Children: A Comparative Study of Lone Parents and Couples with 
Children in Norway and Germany». April 2004. 
8‐2004  Renate  Storetvedt  Lien  og  Arnhild  Taksdal  «Integrering  av  kjønnsperspektiv  i  offentlig 
tjenesteproduksjon og planlegging». Mai 2004. 
9‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy  og Synnøve Serigstad: «Tilsyn  som  styringsform  i  forholdet mellom  staten og 
kommunene». Mai 2004. 
10‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Legemiddeltilsyn og europeisering». September 2004. 
11‐2004  Bodil  Ravneberg:  «Økonomiske  insentiv  i  arbeidslinjen,  virker  det?  Evaluering  av 
forsøksordning med kvalifiseringsstønad i ’Prosjektet Amalie’ i Åsane». Oktober 2004. 
12‐2004  Per  Lægreid  and  Synnøve  Serigstad:  «Organizing  for  Homeland  Security:  The  Case  of 
Norway». November 2004. 
13‐2004  Ivar Bleiklie: «Institutional Conditions and  the Responsibilities of Universities». November 
2004. 
14‐2004  Lise Hellebø: «Food Safety at Stake – the Establishment of Food Agencies». November 2004. 
15‐2004  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Institutional  Construction  of  Consumerism.  A  Study  of 
Implementing Quality Indicators». November 2004.  
16‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy and Anne Homme: «Governance  in Primary and Lower Secondary Education. 
Comparing Norway, Sweden and England». November 2004. 
17‐2004  Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid and  Inger Marie Stigen: «Performance Management and Public 
Sector Reform: The Norwegian Hospial Reform». December 2004. 
18‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Regulatory  Agencies  −  The  Challenges  of  Balancing 
Agency Autonomy and Political Control». December 2004. 
19‐2004  Dag  Arne  Christensen:  «Velferdsstat,  rettighetslovgivning  og  lokalt  selvstyre».  Desember 
2004. 
20‐2004  Kristin  Rubecksen:  «Civil  Service  Organizations  in  Norway:  Organizational  Features  and 
Tasks». December 2004. 
21‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «National  Versus  International 
Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
REGULAT ING  REGULATORY  ORGANIZATIONS:  … WORKING PAPER  5  -  2005  
 37 
22‐2004  Birte Folgerø  Johannessen: «Ledelse og evidens  i det psykiske helsevernet, konsekvenser  for 
kunnskapsforståelse og organisering». Desember 2004. 
23‐2004  Jacob Aars og Svein Kvalvåg: «Politiske uttrykksformer i en bykontekst». Desember 2004. 
24‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing in the Labour Market. Country Report − Norway». December 
2004. 
25‐2004  Torgeir Sveri: «Strukturer og reformer. En kvalitativ analyse av reformen  ’Enhetlig  ledelse’ 
sett i lys av sykehusets arbeidsorganisering». Desember 2004. 
26‐2004  Stig Helleren: «Arbeidstilsynets rollekonflikt: Vekslende tilsynsstrategier mellom kontroll og 
veiledning». Desember 2004. 
27‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Odd  Rune  Straume:  «Globalisation  and  Union 
Opposition to Technological Change». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
28‐2004  Frode  Meland:  «A  Union  Bashing  Model  of  Inflation  Targeting».  December  2004.  The 
Globalization Program. 
2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen og Per Lægreid: «Politisk styring og privatisering: holdninger i elitene og 
befolkningen». Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg and Tor Helge Holmås: «A Panel Data Study of Physiciansʹ 
Labor Supply: The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Unionised  Oligopoly,  Trade 
Liberalisation and Location Choice». March 2003.  The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  –  the  Significance  of  Attitudes 
Towards Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The 
World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa  in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The 
Globalization Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina  Berven:  «Cross  National  Comparison  and  National  Contexts:  Is  what  we  Compare 
Comparable?». July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde  Hatleskog  Zeiner:  «Kontrollhensyn  og  kontrollpraksis.  En  studie  av  Food  and 
Veterinary Office (FVO)». August 2003. 
13‐2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD». August 2003. 
14‐2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». «Den 
sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15‐2003  Ilcheong  Yi:  «The  National  Patterns  of  Unemployment  Policies  in  Two  Asian  Countries: 
Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i  
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
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24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power».  The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon Høst:    «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:    «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og  Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
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25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
